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Book Reviews
ment.. ."; second, by drawing on the common law heritage to enrich con-
stitutional meaning and give it an American cast, and third, by creating a
"mechanism to promote selective, collegial, and confidential decision making,
so that the discretionary features of judging would not be exposed to public
scrutiny" (9). In these ways the Marshall Court fashioned a unified jurispru-
dence that aimed to "maintain the force of eighteenth-century republican
culture" in a new and hostile age (8-9). Here in a nutshell is a new and forceful
interpretation of the Marshall Court-the first since William Crosskey's in
the 1950s, or perhaps Charles Warren's in the 1920s. It deserves to be called
seminal.
Kent Newmyer
University of Connecticut
Kermit L. Hall, The Magic Mirror.- Law in American History, New
York: Oxford University Press, 1989. Pp. ix, 404. $16.95 (ISBN: 0-19-
504460-6).
Once again Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes is our guide to the law's past.
Holmes described the law as "a magic mirror, [wherein] we see reflected, not
only our own lives, but the lives of all men that have been." Kermit Hall
revives Holmes's metaphor as the defining image of his new synthesis of
American legal history. Hall angles his legal mirror to reflect law in American
history, not the history of American law: His subject is the interaction of law
and society from the colonial era to the present.
Hall has succeeded in writing the most comprehensive synthesis we have
of American legal history. He has done so in a crisp, readable style that makes
the book accessible to a wide audience. In the process, The Magic Mirror
effectively summarizes the findings of the "new" legal history that has emerged
over the last twenty years. It also replays, though in a rather muted form, the
interpretive conflicts that engulfed American legal historians in the 1970s and
dominated debate in the 1980s. While Hall does not move the debate along
much, The Magic Mirror does offer a revealing reflection of the substance
and style of American legal history.
Taking Holmes's metaphor to mean that law is "a cultural artifact, a moral
deposit of society" (4), Hall tries to blend the law's many elements into a
single narrative. His aim, articulated most directly in a 1986 article, is "an
integrated history of American legal culture" ("The Magic Mirror: American
Constitutional and Legal History," International Journal of Social Education
1 [1986]: 23). To a greater degree than any other synthesizer, he widens the
chronology and subject matter of American legal history. The Magic Mirror
chronicles American law from the seventeenth century to the late twentieth.
More significant, Hall reunited the numerous dualities that dominate the
writing of legal history: legal and constitutional; public and private; criminal
and civil; commercial and social; law and politics; and internal and external.
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His synthesis instructs us on how to bridge these gaps without denying or
obscuring the distinctiveness of each side of these matched sets.
Hall builds his survey on the "component elements" of the American legal
order (4). These are its structure, substantive rules, and culture. By structure
he means formal legal institutions including legislatures and administrative
agencies as well as courts. He also notes the existence of informal institutions
such as the family and the private association that impinge on the law, though
he does not integrate them fully into his analysis. Hall's catholicism is also
evident in his conception of substantive law, which he takes to include not
merely caselaw and legislation but also administrative rulings and executive
orders at each level of the American federal state. Legal culture is the most
ambitious and ambiguous of his building blocks. He suggests that it has two
components: ideology and interests. Hall examines these components by fo-
cusing on the "rule of Law," which he considers the most significant mani-
festation of American legal culture and the apt measure of its achievements
and conflicts. Melding these elements together is a positivist definition of law
as "a system of choice backed by the power of the state" (7). It allows him
to center his synthesis on formal legal institutions and actors while acknowl-
edging the presence of those outside the system.
The Magic Mirror surveys its three elements in a chronology divided tem-
porally and topically. The emphasis is on adaptation. The division and em-
phasis reflect the literature of the field in concentration and periodization. But
Hall combines topics with common themes that bridge previously separated
domains.
Emblematic of Hall's successes are the integration of criminal law into his
narrative and the melding of legal and constitutional history. In the colonial
era he blends crime into a larger discussion of social and economic change
that surveys dependency, deviance, gender, race, economic regulation, and
substantive commercial rules. He ties these disparate topics together by in-
troducing the themes of adaptation, social necessity, innovation, and struggles
to realize the rule of law. In a similar fashion, he contextualizes later chapters
on the development of criminal law by binding them to his larger story of
adaptation. In the twentieth century, for example, he points out that the
bureaucratization of criminal justice paralleled the application of administra-
tive solutions to other social and economic problems.
Similarly, he weaves together developments in public and private law from
the founding era to the years of legal liberalism. Merging legal and consti-
tutional history is one of Hall's major historiographical causes. He provides
a model of how to do so in paired chapters on the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries that discuss a variety of public and private law issues:
instead of separating public from private law, one chapter focuses on regulation
and the other on adjudication. Hall's schema also has room for topics in the
social history of American law such as race, domestic relations, and profes-
sionalization. Running through all of the chapters are succinct attempts to
contextualize eras of the legal past with concepts that capture dominant as-
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sumptions while acknowledging ambiguities and contradictions. Thus "legal
liberalism" is used to label the dominate ethos of the mid-twentieth century
and to set the cultural stage of descriptions of structural and substantive legal
changes such as the creation of the Environmental Protection Agency and no-
fault divorce.
No one comes to a text without assumptions, and the readers of this journal
bring their own understanding of American legal history to The Magic Mirror
Part of the interest in reading it is discovering just how Hall tackles the
problems of synthesis and interpretation we all confront while teaching and
writing. A revealing example of his resolutions come in discussions of ante-
bellum commercial law. Hall synthesizes the substantial body of work on the
era's private commercial law and addresses the Hurst-Horwitz split over its
meaning.
Judicial instrumentalism is Hall's focus. He describes the way judges took
power from juries, created a facilitating body of corporation law, turned prop-
erty into a dynamic commodity, adopted a will theory of contract, and devised
a fault-based tort law. The implication is that needed legal adaptation occurred
primarily as the result of powerful external forces, in this case a surging market
economy. Disagreements, such as the Taney-Story split over vested rights in
the 1837 Charles River Bridge Case, succumb to a general judicial determi-
nation to maintain a "middle ground" and mediate between the most obvious
winners and losers (123).
Hall attempts the same. He notes that conflicts erupted over commercial
law and that legal changes had uneven consequences. Downplaying their depth
and minimizing their ideological sources and implications, he stresses what
a Kentucky judge called in 1839 "the onward spirit of the age" (127). That
spirit compels Hall to imply broad popular support for the emerging private
law of commerce and to dismiss as overdrawn Horwitz's contentions that it
was the politicized tool of the judiciary wielded to benefit entrepreneurial
elites at the expense of workers and consumers. Hall counters that judges
generally acted in the public interest and, relying on John Reid's work on the
overland trail, that the rule of law thoroughly penetrated American culture
garnering popular support for the legal changes. Trying to locate a middle
interpretive ground, he does concur with Horwitz that judges assumed greater
economic decision-making power and that they removed moral and equitable
considerations from common law dispute resolution.
Judicious balancing, though, is not a substitute for a well-crafted argument.
The absence of a clear interpretion is the book's most conspicuous failing.
Like a mirror, Hall makes his synthesis a rather passive reflection of legal
historiography. Yet he introduces his study by suggesting that American legal
history lacked a compelling explanatory framework. He argues that neither
"critical legal studies" nor "pluralist consensus' which he considers the field's
dominate paradigms, fully capture the legal past (7). He offers no explicit
alternative, though his discussions of topics such as antebellum commercial
law seem to reflect a pluralist view. Hall's position is clearer in his 1986 article,
but in the text he avoids a direct interpretive position.
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Hall is orthodox in his compilation of seemingly objective information,
balanced against the contentious declarations of others. He muffles his in-
terpretive voice in favor of an authorial one that tries to narrate the story of
American law instead of arguing for the validity of a story of American law.
In choosing to do so, Hall loses the opportunity to use his synthesis to chal-
lenge, not merely to recapitulate, our understanding of American legal history.
The lack of a clear interpretive structure is all the more unfortunate because
Hall seems quite qualified for the task. As the author of our most compre-
hensive bibliography, a series of articles on the state of the field, and com-
pilations such as the forthcoming Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court,
Hall clearly has strong views on American legal history. Those views structure
The Magic Mirror and surface occasionally, but are not articulated in a com-
prehensive manner.
The most obvious causalities of Hall's approach are the central propositions
through which he periodically evaluates legal change and tries to give American
legal history continuity. Besides the "magic mirror" metaphor itself, the most
significant running themes are "distributive justice:' "social control," and "the
rule of law." None are fully defined analytically or contextually. Instead they
stand as assertions offered either to suggest the character of legal change or
posit causal forces. For instance, distributive justice is introduced as a standard
by which to judge legislative and judicial allocation of economic costs, benefits,
and risks (88). But the nature of that standard, the fact that its meaning might
vary among legal actors at any particular time, and the implications of its
changes over time are not explained in any detail. For example, in discussing
eminent domain as an instance of antebellum distributive justice Hall asserts
that corporations were better "suited to make efficient economic decisions
about the course to be followed by a railroad or canal than was the legislature"
(100). Yet he neither explains the implications of such an assertion for the
meaning of the term nor why efficiency ought to be the primary basis for
evaluation. Similarly, he suggests that in the Progressive era a traditional
scheme of distributive justice rooted in politics gave way to regulation based
on an a bureaucratized, apolitical model of public policy (190). But he offers
little assessment of the implications of this change for the law and its varied
actors. In similar fashion social control and the rule of law are repeatedly
presented as seemingly unproblematic universals despite a dense historio-
graphical literature that debates their utility in understanding the past. By
developing these key concepts and integrating them into his narrative, Hall
could have guided us through his story more securely. Equally important, he
could have begun to articulate his own vision of the American legal history
as an alternative to the paradigms he discounts.
Articulating a clear perspective on the American legal past could have been
another way for Hall to achieve his primary goal of fitting legal history "into
the mainlines of American historiography" (viii). Two points come to mind:
First, synthesis itself is a major issue. Both the need for syntheses and the
difficulties of synthesizing a fractured subject have been noted extensively.
Book Reviews
Disputes have erupted over just what it means to synthesize a field and even
whether synthesis ought to be attempted at all. Part of the problem, as is
evident in the widespread discussion of Peter Novick's masterful history of
the quest of objectivity, That Noble Dream, is the canon-bashing occurring in
history as in all disciplines. Most relevant here are rising doubts about the
value-free assumptions of many social-science methodologies and the increas-
ingly influential lessons of literary analysis about the political character of all
writing. Though Hall apparently concluded that directly presenting his per-
spective is not the proper style for a synthesizer, it is worth noting Allan
Megill's recent assertion that "[t]he articulation of perspectives is a contri-
bution to knowledge that historians too often overlook or view with discom-
fort" ("Recounting the Past: 'Description, Explanation and Historiography,'
American Historical Review, 94 [1989]: 653). All the more so because The
Magic Mirror reads rather like an effort in objective, social-scientific history.
If so, Hall could have contributed to American historiography by explaining
his position.
Second, Hall's disciplinary proclivities lead him to minimize the implica-
tions of social history for the history of American law. The massive outpouring
of social history poses monumental challenges to all synthesizers. Like the
others, Hall faced real difficulties in integrating social history into his narratives
because of its range and fragmentation. Hall does draw on relevant work on
slaves, women, workers, and criminals as data for empirical descriptions. But
he does not come to grips with the causal arguments that structure the work
he borrows.
It is in counterpoise to social history that the limits of Hall's conception
of legal culture become evident. He identifies legal culture almost solely with
the professionals and institutions of the legal system. He asserts that the
"history of law in the United States, is the history of legal institutions broadly
defined" (89); but the question then becomes: how broadly? Not enough in
The Magic Mirror to include litigants, popular ideology, and institutions out-
side the formal order in any systematic manner. The exceptions are often
troubling. For example, in describing eighteenth- and nineteenth-century law,
Hall consistently depicts popular will as a repressive force trying to subvert
a rather unambiguous rule of law. From the eighteenth-century South Carolina
Regulators to the Reconstruction Klan, popular movements are justifiably
tamed by professionals (35, 56-57, 187-88). Hall's approach tends to make
the public the beneficiaries of lawyers' enlightened quest for justice and not
an agent in the creation of the law.
Yet it is precisely the issue of individual and group agency that lies at the
heart of the social histories that touch on the law. Social histories contain not
only new information but also causal arguments that might expand the in-
terpretive conceptions of legal historians like Hall who seek to discuss Amer-
ican legal culture and escape reigning paradigms. Three examples illustrate
the point: First, Suzanne Lebsock chronicled the struggles by the white married
women in Petersburg, Virginia, to use wills in a different way than their
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husbands. She argued that gender distinctions emerged not merely in usage,
as Hall noted (159), but also in legal ideology and values. Second, Hall noted
the existence of rights consciousness only in conjunction with twentieth-cen-
tury liberal constitutional jurisprudence (284). Hendrik Hartog argues that
rights consciousness has been in force in law since the Revolution, and often
at odds with formal public-law rules and institutions. Hartog contends that
a popular constitional history can be recovered by exploring lay constitutional
aspirations in addition to the story of the national supreme court. Finally,
Anthony Chase proposes that we take popular culture seriously as a part of
the legal order. Though Hall ignores the topic almost entirely, Chase asserts
that "Perry Mason" and "L. A. Law" are but the most recent expressions of
a popular legal culture that has had its own role as a course of legal behavior
and values. None of these arguments is grounded in the two paradigms that
Hall says dominate legal history. They merely suggest that social history can
be used to go beyond positivist definitions of law to include other voices and
other sources of legal change in our stories of American law.
Integrating the causal arguments as well as the information of social history
into American legal history would enlarge the boundaries of legal culture we
see in The Magic Mirror Legal culture would then include informal and formal
institutions, lay and professional legal actors. Such an approach would bridge
social and legal history in the way Hall rightly champions overcoming other
dualities in the field. In short, by developing a more explicit interpretive
structure, Hall could have used his text to suggest ways to recast as well as
summarize American legal history.
The Magic Mirror succeeds in presenting us with the most integrated account
we have of the history of the formal American legal order. It should serve us
well as an introduction to many of the issues of American legal history and
as a starting point for expanding the subject to capture the elusive yet powerful
legal culture that has developed in this society over the last three hundred
years. Kermit Hall deserves our thanks for both achievements. If in the end
the reflection we see in the "Magic Mirror" is rather incomplete, Hall has
told us the story of American law more fully than anyone else. As such, The
Magic Mirror is an effective summation and a useful medium through which
to contemplate new pursuits.
Michael Grossberg
Case Western Reserve University
Jennifer Nedelsky, Private Property and the Limits of American Con-
stitutionalism: The Madisonian Framework and Its Legacy, Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1990. Pp. xiii, 343. $29.95 (ISBN: 0-226-
56970-5).
Professor Nedelsky argues that protection of private property rights was the
core concern of the most prominent framers of the main body of the United
